

THE CRISIS OF THE MOVEMENTS: THE ENABLING STATE AS QUILSLING

PETER J. TAYLOR[†]

In the 1980s world-systems analysis identified and studied what Wallerstein (1988: 588) termed 'the crisis of the movements'. The anti-systemic movements¹ were by now more than a century old and despite numerous political successes the new dawn – another system – seemed to be as far away as ever. The crisis has been confirmed and exacerbated by the events of 1989 with the collapse of the anti-systemic forces own 'Second World'. For conservative critics 1989 may seem to herald the end of the age of revolution (or even the end of history) but this is to put too much weight on just one series of events. Such interpretations merely reiterate the notion of the Cold War as the final contest between alternative worlds, that is to say it is a Cold Warrior interpretation of the end of the Cold War. The fact that world-systems analysts were studying the crisis of the movements before 1989 indicates a longer term view that is not so event-dependent.

The world-systems interpretation of the crisis of the movements focuses on the general nature of their political successes rather than any particular failures. The successes have amounted to the winning and relative consolidation of state power. The problem with this is that it can only be a medium-term palliative within the structures of the capitalist world-economy. It may be a route towards the long term goal of system transformation but it can never be a substitute for it. Hence whatever the quantity or quality of revolutionary successes at the state level such medium term activities are not sufficient. The *raison d'être* of the anti-systemic movements is in the *longue durée* and their crisis is that they have got stuck in their medium term political *cul de sacs*. Hence the very strong sense, widespread before 1989, that the movements had lost their way.

This critique of state-orientated radical politics immediately brings to mind aspects of the anarchist arguments in the radical debates of the late nineteenth century. This paper is a preliminary exploration of the salience of the anarchist critique for our understanding of the contem-

[†] Department of Geography, The University, Newcastle upon Tyne, England NE1 7RU.

porary crisis of the movements. We are broadly sympathetic to the anarchist 'political' position and indeed interpret the 'enabling state' discovered by other radicals in the nineteenth century to be, in twentieth century terms, a 'Quisling'² in the anti-systemic ranks. But this paper is not another attempt to justify and hence revive some variant of anarchism. By using the historical perspective of world-systems analysis I hope to be able to locate anarchism within a broader radical critique. The final result is a simple model that relates the four basic anti-systemic movements – feminism, socialism, nationalism and anarchism – to the four key social institutions of the capitalist world-economy – household, classes, 'peoples' and states. Before we present this model we outline briefly the historical trajectory of the anti-systemic movements as described by Wallerstein and his associates (Arrighi *et al.*, 1990). Our model represents an elaboration on this interpretation by emphasizing institutional contexts so as to place feminism and anarchism on an equal footing to socialism and nationalism. The concluding discussion uses this institutional perspective to elaborate upon Wallerstein's call to 'unthink the nineteenth century' in terms of current anti-systemic political strategy. Our history is about the present and the future.

An historical trajectory of the anti-systemic movements

Socio-economic grievances are ubiquitous to all social systems. When they are expressed through protest this has been typically geographically limited. A wide repertoire of political actions have been devised that are essentially locality-based such as food riots and banditry. Protest beyond a single community requires the development of a consciousness that links grievances across space and an organisation that can mobilise separated discontent. Historically most such movements have been religious in nature and hence have not directly challenged the material base of the system. Large geographical scale secular movements only emerged in the nineteenth century in the aftermath of the great ideological disruption that was the French Revolution. The slogan 'Liberty, Fraternity & Equality' encompassed the revolutionary ideas that were to feed the anti-systemic movements down to the present day.

The standard world-system interpretation of these anti-systemic movements (Wallerstein, 1984, 1988; Arrighi *et al.*, 1990) can be summarized as follows. Initially two movements emerged, first the nationalist movement which suffered its first major set back in 1848 and second the socialist movement which dominated revolutionary politics after 1848 only to suffer a major set back in 1914. The latter movement bifurcated after 1917 into social democratic and communist wings so that by 1945 there were three separate major movements.

Ironically it is in the post-1945 period of unprecedented economic growth in the capitalist world-economy that the three movements reach their respective apogees. This is not unrelated of course, to the emergence of US hegemony and the resulting promotion of 'freedom' in so many contradictory ways. Hence as Wallerstein has pointed out, looking at the mid to late-twentieth century from the vantage point of 1848 the anti-systemic movements have been phenomenally successful. The social democrats came to power and then shared power in nearly all 'First World' states enacting redistribution policies known as the welfare state. The communists constructed their own 'Second World' in which the old ruling classes were vanquished allowing for another major redistribution. The nationalists have overthrown colonial administrations throughout the 'Third World' to create a world of sovereign states without formal imperialism. And yet it is just these successes that were interpreted as failures by the 1980s.

After the end of the 'long post-war boom' and US hegemony (c 1945–1970) all three movements struggled to come to terms with the slow down of the capitalist world-economy. In the 'First World' the social democrats finally accepted the conservative critique of their welfare states, in the 'Second World' the command economies failed, culminating in the 1989 upheavals, and in the 'Third World' the material crisis undermined all the nationalist hopes of freedom as IMF conditions of austerity replaced formal imperialism. This is the crisis of the movements.

Of course this crisis did not creep up on the anti-systemic movements unheralded. Even at the peak of their relative successes in the 1960s there were important reactions leading to new movements. As the crisis unfolded there were further opportunities to challenge the old movements from within. Wallerstein (1988) has identified three such families of new movements each opposed to one of the old movements. In the 'First World', 'New Lefts' have emerged mobilising support in areas neglected by the social democrats. Feminist, environmental and peace movements are the major examples here. In the 'Second World', a series of anti bureaucratic state movements have emerged culminating in Polish Solidarity whose successes ultimately precipitated the 1989 overthrow of regimes throughout eastern Europe. In the Third World an even more heterogeneous collection of movements is emerging to dispute the assumptions of the original national liberation movements; the most spectacular being the Moslem fundamentalist challenge to the western secular basis of the nationalists.

In the 1980s, therefore, there were six major branches of the anti-systemic movement, three old ones challenged by three new ones, each criticising each other. Wallerstein considers each to be broadly correct in their criticism of the others leaving all movements equally limited in their theory and strategy. One of the tasks of world-systems analysis

in this critical situation is to help rebuild a coherent anti-systemic movement from these uncertainties.

In a period of radical political reassessment this world-systems interpretation is a very attractive argument as the debates from three zones of the world-economy are brought together to begin a truly 'global dialogue' of the movements. But the events of 1989 have spoilt this neat arrangement. One debate – in the 'Second World' – seems to be over by popular demand leaving little signs of furthering anti-systemic goals. The problem with the 2-3-6 historical trajectory³ of the movements seems to be the concentration on historical successes and contemporary critiques. It is certainly important to herald relative successes in periods of crisis but there are obviously limitations in neglecting the relative failures in a history. The world-systems interpretation does less than justice, therefore, to the historical origins of the three new movements. All claim a trajectory that begins well before 1960, for instance. We must, of course, always be careful concerning the use of history in terms of 'strained continuities' to legitimate current political positions. Nevertheless despite the fact that the three old movements were by far the major mobilisers against the world-system before 1960, there were other important mobilisations that we should not neglect. The feminist movement has nineteenth century credentials equally as valid as the socialists and nationalists and, of course, the 'green' credentials of the nineteenth century anarchist movement continue to deserve our attention. In short there is another world-systems interpretation of anti-systemic movements in which these other mobilisations are given due weight.

Social institutions and political movements

An alternative approach to the construction of anti-systemic movements in the nineteenth century can be derived from the world-systems analysis interpretation of social institutions. The ubiquitous socio-economic grievances are experienced in the first instance by individuals and have to be converted into collective concerns. Hence the social context of experienced grievance is important. This context can be defined in terms of social institutions since every individual's integration into the capitalist world-economy is mediated through a myriad of institutions. Let us consider the key social institutions.

Wallerstein (1984) describes the 'cultural mosaic' of the capitalist world-economy as an 'institutional vortex' which consists of just four major social institutions. These are household, classes, 'peoples' and states. According to Wallerstein (1984: 14) all four are "shaped (even created) by the on-going workings of the world-economy." They took

their modern form in the period following the French Revolution. Households are the 'atoms' of the system defined in terms of small income-pooling groups. Classes are the economic strata defined in relation to the mode of production. 'Peoples' are the most amorphous institution that may be expressed in several cultural forms ranging from world-wide races to intra-urban ethnic groups. We will be concerned with the most important category of 'peoples', the nations. Finally, the states define the formal rules by which the other institutions are required to operate. Every individual is a member of a household, class and nation as well as being a citizen of a state. This is "a structured maelstrom of constant movement" (Wallerstein, 1984: 29) through which the grievances of individuals are filtered. As the "moral life" (Wallerstein, 1984: 36) of the system, the complex conversion of grievances to movements should be sought here. This is where the "tension between imperium and resistance" (Wallerstein, 1984: 22) is forged and therefore the four institutions provide the opportunities for individual grievances to be mobilised as movements.

The standard world-systems analysis interpretation of nineteenth-century anti-systemic movements employs two of the four institutions. Nation and class are particularly amenable to mobilisation because of the geographical concentration of the grievances (Wallerstein, 1984: 20). This may account for the dominance of the nationalist and socialist movements but it does not mean that mobilisations did not occur in relation to the other two institutions. A model of social institutions and political movements incorporating all four major institutions is presented in Table 1 as a means of locating nationalism and socialism within the fuller context of the moral life of the capitalist world-economy.

The model encompasses six components that lead from the location of a material grievance through to the form of conflict that the resulting social movement constructs. First, and as we have already noted, the location of grievances is identified within each of the four major institutions. Second, the grievance is interpreted as a consequence of inequalities produced by the particular social relations that define each institution. Third, mobilisation requires a theory to identify the grievance in general terms. Fourth, this critical argument provides the practical lesson in terms of finding the target for the mobilised. Fifth, and of key importance, is the translation of the general theory into a popular cause for the mobilisation to focus upon. Sixth target and cause between them specify a particular form of conflict which defines the political process promoted by the mobilisation. Let us now consider briefly each institutional context and its associated political movement in turn.

As has commonly been observed, households are the most neglected institution in political analysis. In our model they are given equal status

Table 1 Social Institutions and Political Movements

Location of material grievance ↓ Institutional focus	Form of inequality ↓ Social relations	Theory of resistance ↓ Critical argument	Practical lesson ↓ Target	Mobilisation focus ↓ Cause	Form of conflict ↓ Political process
Households	Gender relations (women vs men)	Feminist critique	Patriarchy	Women	Women's liberation
Classes	Class relations (proletariat vs bourgeoisie)	Socialist critique	Capitalism	Workers of the world	Class struggle
'Peoples'	'Cultural' relations (subject nations vs imperial nations)	Nationalist critique	Imperialism	The people	National self-determination
States	Dominance relations (individual vs state apparatus)	Anarchist critique	Authority	Downtrodden people everywhere	Direct action, propaganda by deed

and we can easily justify this position. By the nineteenth century the separation of work and home produced bourgeois and proletarian households in which men and women were allocated separate spheres of activity. The resulting gender relations produced an inequality for women. The most obvious expression of this was that married women had no legal rights so that they could not own property or receive income. The feminist critique which theorized these circumstances can be traced back to the French Revolution in Mary Wollstonecraft's *A Vindication of the Rights of Women* (1792) although the movement did not emerge until the mid-nineteenth century (Banks, 1988). This mobilisation had as a cause 'women's rights', the target of patriarchy was identified and women's liberation became the political process that was pursued.

The political movement associated with classes is much more well-known. In the nineteenth century class relations of bourgeoisie versus proletariat were coming to dominate large industrial regions of north-west Europe. The form of inequality in terms of ownership of the means of production was very clear and led to the socialist critique of society. Again this can be traced back to the French Revolution and the Brabeuf's 'Society of Equals' of 1795 (Brauthal, 1967). This theory indicted capitalism for the material grievances and found its cause in Marx's 1848 call to 'workers of the world' who were being mobilised for 'class struggle'.

The political movement associated with 'peoples' as nations or incipient nations is also well-known and fits our model as follows. National awareness is the most direct expression of inequality to arise from the French Revolution (Billington, 1980). The particular relations of small cultural groups and larger states became transmuted into subject nations and imperial states. The uneven economic development of the nineteenth century exacerbated the grievances between cultural groups. The resulting nationalist critique produced a theory that equality in the world depended upon the free expression of 'true nations'. This was the main form of revolutionary activity in the first half of the nineteenth century. Mobilisation behind the cause of 'the people' against what became known as imperialism produced a new politics of national self-determination.

Finally, the states as a source of anti-systemic movements are surprisingly neglected although they too fit neatly into our model. States were the locales of formal authority and as such created their own specific grievance and inequality. The anarchist critique that theorised this situation is again usually traced back to the French Revolution, this time through William Godwin's *Enquiry Concerning Political Justice* of 1793 (Woodcock, 1962), although the movement came much later. The dominance relation of individual to an all-powerful state apparatus produced a myriad of grievances as the state grew in power and influence through the nineteenth century. As well as the urban proletariat

of socialist concern, small peasants, landless rural workers and the destitute of the city were all in their different ways coerced by the state. The anarchist claimed the 'downtrodden' oppressed of the world as their cause, authority vested in the state as their target, and attempted to mobilise the 'powerless' through direct action – 'propaganda by deed', ranging from educational initiatives to political assassinations.

Hence the four major institutions of the world-economy can each be associated with the origins of four anti-systemic movements in the nineteenth century. Before we move on to discuss briefly the subsequent historical trajectories of the four movements we need to make one point very clear. All anti-systemic movements are in some sense *against* the world-system by definition but they are also *of* the world-system. Our linking of the movements to social institutions emphasizes the fact that contradictions of the system will be expressed, therefore, in the politics that are our concern. For instance anti-systemic movements continually face political dilemmas where their short term interests contradict their long term goals. Furthermore their causes and mobilisations may be hijacked to serve pro-systemic interests. This is most clearly illustrated in the history of nationalism but is equally true of the other three movements. What this means in terms of the current crisis of movements we will leave for subsequent discussion. All we need to note here is that the dilemmas are endemic to the movements which will have important implications for their historical trajectories.

The enabling state and the isolation of anarchism

Tracing the trajectories of the movements is fraught with problems not least because of the nature of their respective histories. Fleming (1988) warns us about treating reconstructed 'traditions' of thought as representing actual historical continuities. Here is a radical use of history to legitimate a present just as much as in the more familiar Whig varieties. We have already noted that the ideas associated with our four movements can be traced back to the ideological turmoil of the French Revolution. However the conversion of radical ideas into movements can take generations to achieve. Furthermore once movements are created their success is not guaranteed so that trajectories consist of a mixture of periods of fervour and action but also quiet times when the movement may even appear to disappear. We should continue, in the spirit of Fleming (1988), to be suspicious of continuities and especially supposed triumphant marches of progress.

In this section we will argue that the transition period from the final years of British hegemony to the establishment of a more competitive interstate system (c 1860–1880) is a major watershed in the nature of the

anti-systemic movements. The reorganisation in the inter-state system itself in this period is well-known, here we will argue that just as important changes were occurring within the movements. To illustrate this we will begin by using some standard histories of the movements to chart a synchronisation of change in all four movements.

In the first half of the nineteenth century most revolutionary activity was associated with the nationalist movement. The Napoleonic armies were responsible for spreading the ideal of the 'nation' throughout Europe from Italy and Spain as far as Poland. Although what Braunthal (1967) calls the 'Counter-Revolutionary International' of the Holy Alliance largely kept the movement in check between 1815 and 1848, there were nationalist successes in Greece and Belgium outside this Alliance. The defeats of the nationalist revolts within the empires of the Holy Alliance in 1848 were a vital setback, not to nationalism as an idea but as a radical movement.

Billington (1980: 324) describes subsequent developments as "a dramatic metamorphosis of nationalism." The Mazzinian vision of a world of free and friendly nations (wars were only to be a transitional phenomenon necessary for deposing kings) became an aggressive world of nation-states. National revolution from below gave way to reactionary nationalism from above: "Nationalism had been taken over and de-radicalised by the great state builders of the post-1848 era: Napoleon III, Cavour, Bismark" (Billington, 1980: 364). Billington traces the key period of change to the 1860s. The final successful revolutionary nationalist movement of the century was in Romania in 1859. The defeat of the Polish national revolt in 1863 was to mark the end of an era. The other great nationalist cause, Italy, was successful but not through revolution, unification was achieved by the *realpolitik* of Cavour. Henceforth nationalism was to become that ambiguous cause that has bedevilled revolutionaries to the present time (Blaut, 1987).

In terms of categories of nationalism, this 'metamorphosis' represents the emergence of what Anderson (1983) terms 'state nationalism' eclipsing the earlier 'popular nationalism'. In state nationalism the cause of nationalism becomes a tool of the state and not vice versa as the old romantic nationalists had envisaged. Radical popular nationalisms have reappeared in the twentieth century of course in Ireland, the Balkans and elsewhere throughout the world, but they have nowhere managed to insulate their successes from state imperatives. The world as a 'family of nations' remains a myth.

From the 1830s onwards the national revolutionaries were challenged by a new movement that claimed a 'universal' cause. A wide range of utopian, anarchist and socialist ideas evolved so that before 1860 there is blurring of the distinction between anarchists and socialists. The practical politicking of Marx in the 1860s and early 1870s is central to the

hiving off of anarchism from the socialist mainstream. The focus of debate once again concerns relations of the movement to the state. In Germany Ferdinand Lassalle had formed, in 1862, a workers' movement that was more than willing to compromise with the Prussian state to serve its particular ends. Marxists fought political battles against the Lassallians throughout this period. In contrast, in France Proudhon dominated radical circles with his self-professed anarchism. With the formation of the 'First International' in 1864, Marx wrote an Inaugural Address that accommodated the Proudhonist wing of the movement. Not surprisingly, however, 'deep seated differences of attitude concerning the state and workers policy in relation to it then made their appearance' (Cole, 1954: 111). The compromise with the anarchist wing finally collapsed after the admission of Michael Bakunin to the International in 1868. Over the next four years Marx manoeuvred the organisation to accept the need to form political parties and join in the formal politics of states. Whatever weight is given to the Bakunin-Marx rift in the 1870s the distinction between socialists and anarchists now becomes clear (Woodcock, 1962). Fleming (1988) emphasises the strategic choice that had to be made in relation to the constitutional reforms that were being made at this time. Was the extension of the franchise an opportunity or a trap? The Marxists thought the former, the anarchists the latter. After the unification of Germany the Marxists made the alternative compromise with the Lassallians in the Gotha Programme of 1875 that set up the German Social Democratic Party. Although initially criticised by Marx, and subsequently revised in the Erfurt Programme of 1891 to be less Lassallean, in fact from 1875 the socialist movement was firmly set on the road to 'state socialism' (Cole, 1954: 427; Taylor, 1987). In contrast the anarchists in the 1870s began to develop their ecological theory of communities as a negation of the state and its authority (Fleming, 1988). The two groups could now no longer be confused as a single revolutionary movement.

The women's movement became organised in the 1840s and 1850s around "the issues of women's property and earnings, child custody and the double standard" (Banks, 1986: 133). The change in the movement after 1860 is just as dramatic as in the other cases. The women's suffrage campaign came to dominate feminism to such a degree that they were widely viewed as being one and the same thing. The vote was viewed "as the key to all other changes women wanted to see in society" (Banks, 1986: 135) and the mobilisation was to become very successful:

Women as varied as temperance workers in the United States and textile workers in Britain's northern towns turned to the suffrage campaign as the best way, if not the only way, to ensure victory for their cause (Banks, 1986: 148).

Despite the militancy of the early twentieth century this narrow focus on access to state power in fact was another case of deradicalisation. When the suffrage extension came it was a matter of reform from above. Since the movement had become so closely associated with this one goal its achievement resulted in a complete loss of mass appeal. The movement went into the "doldrums of the 1920s to 1960s" (Banks, 1986: 149–50) from which it has only recently emerged.

What is the basis of this synchronisation in these fundamental changes in the movements? It is clear that changes in the inter-state system are complemented by *domestic* changes within states. The state becomes viewed more and more overtly as an *enabling state* to be used to meet the ends of different groups. With the demise of Britain's hegemonic liberal economic order, for instance, bourgeois groups use the state to construct their 'new mercantilism' presaging the new age of imperialism. For three of the movements the state appears more than ever as a potential ally to achieve their goals. This 'Lassalleian' position becomes broadly accepted by all but the anarchists for whom the state itself is the problem. The other three movements suffer different degrees of deradicalisation but each in their different ways have strengthened the inter-state system itself. Hence they have negated their own longer term goals of transforming the system. This is what is meant by labelling the enabling state as Quisling. The political result has been the stranding of anarchism on the shore of splendid isolation.⁴

The false question of priorities

It is the period we have identified as the 'watershed' that Wallerstein (1986) is referring to when he calls on the movements to 'unthink the nineteenth century' in terms of political strategy. Furthermore the strategy he is criticising is, of course, the goal of winning state power to further anti-systemic aims. Hence the latent conclusion of my previous discussion basically comes to the same position that Wallerstein has previously charted. Nevertheless the conclusion has been reached from a slightly different direction which promises alternative emphasis in considering the crisis of the movements.

The main point that arises out of the four-fold analysis of movements is that each on its own produces a very limited emancipatory politics. It is very easy to list historical examples of discriminatory politics pursued by one movement against another; trade unions against women and minority employment, middle class feminists for the property franchise and the masculine 'heroism' of romantic nationalists are just some examples. There have, of course, been important debates between the movements beyond the famous socialist-anarchist clash that we high-

lighted above. Socialists also debated with feminists and nationalists and all sides had both their 'purists' and their 'mixers'. Generally the movements remained apart. The classic example is the separate but contemporaneous claims on the British state in 1912 to 1914. A genuine crisis of the imperial state resulted from militant challenges by labour, women suffragettes and Irish nationalists. The crisis was solved by war when most of the supporters of the above groups rallied to the defence of king and country. In fact the state imperative seems to have been the only common cause of these movements!

The reason why there have been difficulties in bringing the movements together is that each side in a debate prioritizes socio-economic grievances locating its own concern at the head of the list. Women, for instance, were asked to wait for the socialist dawn when their grievances would be attended to. Not surprisingly coalitions have often been difficult and fragile. The most successfully sustained anti-systemic force, however, did involve a coalescence of two movements, socialism and nationalism, in the anti-imperialist liberation movements of the post-1945 period. Nevertheless on our criterion even these national liberation movements remain only partial embodiments of the whole body of anti-systemic movements: the new states they produced have become some of the most repressive in the modern world.

If we are not to prioritize but insist on attending to all four sets of grievances, it follows that our identification of the isolation of anarchism cannot require a 'return to anarchism' as a solution. Rather the anarchist critique must be re-integrated into anti-systemic thinking. We do not need a 'new anarchism' (e.g. Bookchin, 1986) based on the new material circumstances of the late twentieth century but a combined movement where all four forms of grievance are mutually respected.

Nevertheless anarchist thinking can claim a pivotal role in any re-assessment of anti-systemic strategy. Since the 'watershed', the other three movements have effectively indulged in a century of anti-anarchist politics which has culminated in the crisis of the movements. Hence it can be argued reasonably that questions of community and human scale, which lay at the heart of the late nineteenth century anarchist project but are neglected by the other movements, should form part of a new agenda that is far more sceptical of the enabling state.

Conclusion: the de-reification of political space

We began this essay by relating the crisis of the movements to the general political dilemma of longterm goals and shorter term political practices. The crisis is that the chosen political practices no longer seem to chart a route through to the alternative worlds the movements are

trying to reach. In one sense the anarchist movement was the original anti-systemic victim of this dilemma. The anarchists failed, not because of radical disagreement over their goals, but because the means to their ends were not credible. The various forms of direct action they practised did not add up to a viable political programme in the view of most fellow revolutionaries with their new state-centric politics. We remain unable to close this credibility gap. The *longue durée* vision of self-sufficient, ecologically sound communities living in peaceful harmony is never going to be a feasible creation within the current world-system. The problem of how such communities without a coercive state apparatus can prevent themselves being exploited and swallowed up by neighbouring states is insoluble within the structures of the world-economy (Taylor, 1982). The time for such community construction may come as the modern world-system can no longer sustain itself. When economic growth reaches its environmental limits the anarchist vision will become increasingly consistent with the material needs of world society. But this argument does not define a politics. To wait for 'our time to come' is no politics at all.

It is not that the *longue durée* should be neglected or ever ignored, obviously goals must always remain the *raison d'être* of the politics, rather the trick is to construct a politics *within* the world-system that can serve anti-systemic aims. State-centric radical politics has not fulfilled its nineteenth century promise in this respect; it is time, as Magnusson & Walker (1988) term it, to 'de-center' the state from political practices.

From a political geography perspective state-centric politics is a particular distribution of power across space. Politics is bounded, power is captured in a mosaic of political spaces. Of course non-critical political geography, both formal and practical,⁵ treats the politics of the world-system as it appears so that these political spaces are reified and politics is equated with the state itself. The seduction of most radical politics between 1860 and 1880 by the enabling state as described above has meant that the anti-systemic movements have equally reified the political spaces as created by their opponents. As Magnusson & Walker (1988: 49) term it, "socialist politics is trapped on bourgeois terrain" and we would add that the same is true for radical nationalist and feminist politics. Clearly the time has come to de-reify the political spaces of our world.

Creating an alternative political geography of practice is not just a matter of political will, of course. There needs to be a material base upon which the alternative politics can be built. And here the prospects are by no means as bleak as those faced by the anarchists of a century ago. As the state finds it more and more difficult to mediate successfully between global capital and local communities it inevitably loses part of its enabling appeal. Whatever label we give to the increased social polarization of the

late twentieth century, the erosion of the welfare state ideal is the crucial indicator of the changed circumstances. As the state comes to be seen as more disabling than enabling⁶ then the potential exists for anti-systemic movements to break out from the political spaces in which they have been controlled for the last century.

Is this potential being converted to concrete political practice? Magnusson and Walker (1988) believe so. By a process of local struggles confronting global processes, peace, feminist and ecology movements have generated new global solidarities in the last twenty years. Here we find the creation of new political spaces in "the rejection of state power as the primary object of (political) activity" (Magnusson & Walker, 1988: 63; see also Wallerstein, 1984: 93–6). The state is not rejected as an arena for struggle, it is after all one of the four key institutions, but it is no longer privileged and, most of all, the limitations of state-centric politics are recognised.

Notes

1. Anti-systemic movement is the term used in world-systems analysis to indicate a general political movement whose goals are to change the basic structures of the capitalist world-economy. In Magnusson and Walker's (1988: 61–62) terms they are critical social movements that have developed beyond the stages of 'struggles of specificity' and 'struggles of connection' to become 'struggles of imagination' for a new world. They are not utopian but operate through concrete political struggles.
2. Vidkun Quisling was the Norwegian Nazi leader who took power after the German invasion of 1940. His name was immediately added to the English language as a term of abuse. He was shot as a collaborator at the end of World War II.
3. 2-3-6 trajectory is shorthand for the history of the movements described previously i.e. two movements in the nineteenth century, three after 1917 and six after 1960.
4. I do not mean that there has been no anarchist movement in the twentieth century but that its system-wide momentum has been severely checked. Of course the materialist basis of the anarchist critique has not been eradicated so that aspects of the anarchist movement have been reconstructed in some surprising forms in the twentieth century. Human rights movements in Latin America, peace movements in western Europe and the German Greens in particular all involve anti-state or anti-authority positions that can be described as anarchistic. This argument is illustrated in Giddens (1985: 314–17) discussion of the similarities between the peace and ecology movements. Two outstanding examples of direct action through propaganda by deed in the 1980s are the activities of Greenpeace and Amnesty International.
5. By 'formal' I mean the production of political geography as a sub-discipline by academics, by 'practical' I mean the production of the concrete political geography of our world by politicians.
6. It is important that this is a world-wide phenomenon. The erosion of the welfare state is its 'first world' expression, the total collapse of communist

regimes – they had become disabling states – is its ‘second world’ expression and, of course, the horror of ‘third world’ states after the high hopes of political independence is that they are disabling for most of their populations in a most extreme way. As political collaborators with the ‘first world’, ‘third world’ states have been the ultimate Quislings of our age.

References

- Anderson, B.** (1983) *Imagined Communities*. London: Verso.
- Arrighi, G., T.K. Hopkins and I. Wallerstein** (1990) *Antisystemic Movements*. London: Verso.
- Banks, O.** (1986) *Faces of Feminism*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Billington, J.H.** (1980) *Fire in the Minds of Men*. London: Temple Smith.
- Blaut, J.** (1987) *The National Question*. London: Zed.
- Bookchin, M.** (1986) *Post-Scarcity Anarchism*. Montreal: Black Rose.
- Brautal, J.** (1967) *History of the International*. New York: Praeger.
- Cole, G.D.H.** (1954) *Socialist Thought, Marxism & Anarchism, 1850–1890*. London: Macmillan.
- Fleming, M.** (1988) *The Geography of Freedom*. Montreal: Black Rose.
- Giddens, A.** (1985) *The Nation-State and Violence*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Magnusson, W. and R. Walker** (1988) Decentering the state: political theory and Canadian political economy. *Studies in Political Economy* 26: 37–71.
- Taylor, M.** (1982) *Community, Anarchy & Liberty*. Cambridge: University Press.
- Taylor, P.J.** (1982) The paradox of geographical scale and Marx's politics. *Antipode* 19: 287–306.
- Wallerstein, I.** (1984) *The Politics of the World-Economy*. Cambridge: University Press.
- Wallerstein, I.** (1986) *Should we unthink the Nineteenth Century?* Binghamton, N.Y.: Fernand Braudel Center.
- Wallerstein, I.** (1988) Typology of crises in the world-system. *Review* 11: 581–98.
- Woodcock, G.** (1962) *Anarchism*. London: Penguin.